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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Patrick Ian Rodriguez appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdicts finding him guilty of four counts of sexual battery of a minor child 16 or
17 years of age.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Rodriguez sexually battered his stepdaughter, K.S., on several separate
occasions when K.S. was between the ages of 16 and 17 years old. (Trial Tr.,
p.196, L.15 - p.209, L.5.) The first incident of abuse occurred when K.S. had
just gotten out of the shower and was walking from the bathroom to her bedroom
wearing only a towel. (Trial Tr., p.200, L.15 - p.204, L.3.) Rodriguez stopped
K.S. in the hallway and told her "he wanted to make sure that everything was
okay" and "wanted to parent [K.S.] in the best way that he knew how to." {Trial
Tr., p.200, Ls.19-23.)

He asked K.S. to open up her towel and, when K.S.

complied, Rodriguez "visually inspected" and then touched and "fe[lt] around"
K.S.'s unclothed breasts. (Trial Tr., p.202, L.5 - p.203, L.22.)
Rodriguez engaged in similar conduct with K.S. on multiple occasions
during the spring of 2007 and 2008.

(Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.4-17, p.207, L.2 -

p.208, L.5.) During that same timeframe, Rodriguez also touched K.S.'s vagina
on a number of different occasions while K.S. was wearing only a towel. (Trial
Tr., p.204, L.18 - p.206, L.15, p.208, L.22 - p.209, L.5.) In doing so, Rodriguez
again told K.S. that "he wanted to parent [her] in the best way that he knew how
and wanted to take care of [her]." (Trial Tr., p.204, L.18 - p.205, L.2.) He also
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said, "he wanted to make sure that everything was okay down there and that
[K.S.'s] panties were fitting a little too tight." (Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.2-5.) Under this
guise, Rodriguez knelt down and "visually inspect[ed]" K.S.'s unclothed vagina
and then "touch[ed] the lips" and "open[ed] it up a little bit." (Trial Tr., p.205, L.6
- p.206, L.6.)
During a police interview, Rodriguez admitted to having touched K.S.'s
breasts but claimed he did so only to check for abnormalities, not for any sexual
purpose. (State's Exhibit 5.) He also admitted to having checked the fit of K.S.'s
panties while they were on her and claimed that, if he touched K.S.'s vagina, it
was accidental and for a non-sexual purpose. (State's Exhibit 5.)
A grand jury indicted Rodriguez on four counts of sexual battery of a
minor child 16 or 17 years of age. 1 (R., pp.25-28.) Before trial, the state filed a
Notice of Intent to Use I.RE. 404(b) evidence. (R., pp.48-50.) Specifically, the
state gave notice of its intent to present evidence that on multiple occasions "in
the last three to four years" Rodriguez asked his wife's friend if he could see her
breasts, and that on one occasion he asked his wife's step-mother if he could
see and/or touch her breasts. (R., pp.48-49; see also 3/5/13 Tr., p.20, L.23 p.23, L.1, p.27, L.11 - p.30, L.22.)

Rodriguez objected to the proposed

evidence, arguing it was not relevant for any proper purpose and, even if it was,
its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. (R., pp.67-69; see also 3/5/13 Tr., p.23, L.17 - p.26, L.24.) After a
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The grand jury also indicted Rodriguez on one count of sexual abuse of a child
under the age of 16 years (R., pp.25-26), but the state dismissed that charge
before trial (3/5/13 Tr., p.4, L.19 - p.5, L.11 ).
2

hearing, the district court ruled the proposed evidence would "come in over
[Rodriguez's] 404(b) objection" because it was "relevant as to the essential
element of intent" as it related to the sexual battery charges in this case. (3/5/13
Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.12.) The court also determined any danger of unfair
prejudice could be ameliorated by a limiting instruction directing the jury to only
consider the evidence for its proper purpose.

(3/5/13 Tr., p.31, L.13 - p.32,

L.12.) The court thus permitted the state to present the evidence at trial. (3/5/13
Tr., p.32, Ls.11-12; Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.6-20, p.286, L.22-p.288, L.17, p.298, L.7
- p.303, L.19.)

Immediately following presentation of the evidence, the court

instructed the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have heard evidence
that on other occasions, the defendant engaged in conduct of a
sexual nature with two adult women. This evidence is not to be
considered in order to show that the defendant is a bad character
or that he has the propensity to engage in such conduct.
If and to the extent you believe the testimony, you may only
consider it as it may relate to the defendant's intent in engaging in
the alleged conduct described in Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment
[i.e., the counts alleging Rodriguez sexually battered K.S. "by
groping her breast(s)" (R., pp.26-27)].
(Trial Tr., p.313, L.21 - p.314, L.7.)
The jury found Rodriguez guilty as charged of four counts of sexual
battery. (R., pp.93-94.) Rodriguez moved for a new trial, arguing the court erred
in admitting the state's 404(b) evidence.

(R., pp.206-13; see also Trial Tr.,

pp.566-69.) The trial court denied the motion. (R., pp.298-99; see also Trial Tr.,
p.581, Ls.2-21.) Rodriguez timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.175-83.)
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ISSUE
Rodriguez states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded that the
probative value of the Rule 404(b) evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice?
(Appellant's brief, p.3)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Rodriguez failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the state's I.RE. 404(b) evidence? More specifically, has Rodriguez
failed to show the district court abused its discretion in determining the probative
value of the state's I.RE. 404(b) evidence to establish Rodriguez's intent was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice where Rodriguez's
intent was directly at issue and where the court gave a limiting instruction
directing the jury to only consider the evidence for its proper purpose?
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ARGUMENT
Rodriguez Has Failed To Establish That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In
Admitting The State's I.RE. 404(b) Evidence
A.

Introduction
The trial court permitted the state to introduce evidence that, on multiple

occasions near the time Rodriguez was alleged to have committed the sexual
batteries in this case, he asked two adult women if he could see and/or touch
their breasts. (3/5/13 Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.32, L.12, p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.7; Trial
Tr., p.10, Ls.6-20, p.286, L.22 - p.288, L.17, p.298, L.7 - p.303, L.19.)

On

appeal, Rodriguez does not challenge the trial court's determination that the
evidence was relevant to show his intent as it related to the charged crimes;
rather, he argues only "that the danger of unfair prejudice in admitting the other
act evidence substantially outweighed its minimal probative value, and as such,
the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence over his
objection." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Rodriguez's argument fails. The trial court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, applied the correct legal
standards and exercised reason in determining that the probative value of the
challenged

evidence

to

show

Rodriguez's

intent was

not substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rodriguez has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court's determination that the probative value of evidence of other

bad acts for a permissible purpose is not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice "is discretionary and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it
is shown to be an abuse of discretion." State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 591,
301 P.3d 242, 249 (2013) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d
273, 283 (2007); State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991));
see also I.R.E. 403. When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for
an abuse of discretion, it conducts "a multi-tiered inquiry, examining 1) whether
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 2) whether the
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and 3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919,
921,216 P.3d 1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).

C.

Rodriguez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Determining The Probative Value Of The State's I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence
Was Not Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove the

character of the defendant in an attempt to show that he or she committed the
crime for which he or she stands trial. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d
1185, 1188 (2009). However, such evidence is admissible if (a) it is relevant to
prove some issue other than the defendant's character (e.g., motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident),
and (b) its probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed
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by the probability of unfair prejudice. I.RE. 403, 404(b); State v. Cross, 132
Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845
P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct.
App. 1989). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the danger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan,
139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). This weighing process is
"committed to the judge's sound discretion." State v. Buzzard, 110 Idaho 800,
802, 718 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ct. App. 1986).
Applying the above legal principles, the district court found that evidence
that Rodriguez asked on more than one occasion to look at or feel the breasts of
two adult women was "relevant as to the essential element of intent," particularly
as it related to Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment that charged Rodriguez with
sexual battery by having groped K.S. 's breasts with the intent to gratify his own
sexual desire. (3/5/13 Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31, L.12, p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.5; see
also Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.6-16.) Although the court concluded the evidence was
relevant for this permissible purpose, it "also very well appreciate[d] that even
though relevant, some evidence may not be admitted if there's substantial
danger that the relevance of [the] evidence is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice." (3/5/13 Tr., p.31, Ls.13-19.) The court thus engaged
in the I.RE. 403 weighing process and ultimately concluded that, with an
appropriate limiting instruction, the probative value of the evidence to show
Rodriguez's sexual intent would not be substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.

(3/5/13 Tr., p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.12.)
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Clearly, the court

understood its discretion and acted within the bounds of that discretion in
weighing the potential for unfair prejudice.
On appeal, Rodriguez does not challenge the district court's determination
that the evidence in question was relevant to the issue of his intent. He argues,
however, that "the relevance of the evidence is incredibly minimal" as compared
to its potentially prejudicial effect and, therefore, "the district court abused its
discretion when it concluded that the relevance of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." (Appellant's brief,
pp.5-8.)

In an attempt to support his claim that the probative value of the

evidence was "incredibly minimal," Rodriguez points to what he perceives to be
"significant differences" between the uncharged and charged acts. (Appellant's
brief, p.6.) He also contends it is "common sense" that heterosexual men, such
as himself, "consider a woman's breasts to be sexual objects" and, therefore,
evidence that Rodriguez solicited two adult women to show him or let him feel
their breasts was not particularly probative "to show that his contact with K.S.'s
breasts was for the purpose of gratifying his sexual desires." (Appellant's brief,
pp.6-7.) Neither of Rodriguez's arguments have merit.
As summarized by the district court, the evidence in question consisted of
testimony that, "on two or more prior occasions," Rodriguez "asked two different
unrelated adult women" - his wife's friend and his wife's stepmother - "to expose
their breasts to him, and on one occasion had asked one of the women to allow
him to touch her breasts." (Trial Tr., p.10, Ls.6-11; compare with Trial Tr., p.277,
L.6 - p.278, L.2, p.283, L.19 - p.288, L.23, p.294, L.1 - p.295, L.6, p.298, L.7 -
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p.303, L.19.) Rodriguez argues these uncharged acts were significantly different
than the conduct with which he was charged in this case because the uncharged
incidents of "proposition[ing]" "occurred in residences during social gatherings
when other people were in the homes," whereas his "touching of K.S.'s breasts
occurred while they were alone at the family home, and did not involve a similar
overtly sexual proposition."

(Appellant's brief, p.6 (citations to transcript

omitted}.) Rodriguez misses the point. The two adult women both testified they
were alone with Rodriguez on the occasions when he asked to see and/or touch
their breasts.

(Trial Tr., p.284, L.22 - p.288, L.17, p.302, L.6 - p.303, L.19.)

There can be no question - and, indeed, Rodriguez appears to concede - that
his actions with respect to the two adult women were "overtly sexual."
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) That others were present in the home, but not in the
same room, when these incidents occurred does not diminish the probative value
of the evidence to establish whether Rodriguez also acted with sexual intent
when, near in time to the uncharged incidents, he sought out his then 16- or 17year-old stepdaughter when she was alone, asked her to open her towel and felt
her breasts.
Rodriguez posits that, because it is "common sense" and "cannot be
disputed" that he, as a heterosexual male, would be attracted to developed
female breasts, the evidence that he solicited two adult women to see and/or feel
their breasts was "only minimally relevant" to show he acted with similar sexual
intent when he touched K.S.'s breasts. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) Rodriguez's
argument is unavailing because it entirely ignores the fact that Rodriguez
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expressly disclaimed having touched K.S.'s breast for any sexual purpose.
During his interview with police, Rodriguez admitted to having touched K.S.'s
breasts but claimed he did so only to check for abnormalities. (State's Exhibit 5.)
Because Rodriguez offered a "legitimate" reason for having touched the
unclothed breasts of his 16- or 17-year-old stepdaughter, his intent was directly
at issue. Evidence that Rodriguez had, on other occasions near the time of the
charged incidents, engaged in virtually identical "overtly sexual" conduct with two
other females not his stepdaughter was more than "minimally relevant" to rebut
his defense.
Rodriguez's assessment of the potentially prejudicial effect of the
challenged evidence is similarly flawed. He argues the evidence was "incredibly
prejudicial, especially in light of the relationships of the people with whom he
engaged, or attempted to engage, in such behavior," and that it "raise[d] the
likelihood that the jury was predisposed to judge [him] more harshly than it would
have in the absence of the evidence of his bad behavior." (Appellant's brief,
p.8.) What Rodriguez fails to acknowledge, however, is that the district court
specifically recognized this potential for unfair prejudice and minimized the risk of
such prejudice by giving a limiting instruction directing the jury to only consider
the evidence for its proper purpose. (3/5/13 Tr., p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.12; Trial Tr.,
p.313, L.14 - p.314, L.7.) Assuming, as this Court must, that the jury followed
the court's instruction, see State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 690, 273 P.3d 1271,
1283 (2012), there is no risk that the jury considered the evidence for anything
other than its proper purpose. Rodriguez has thus failed to show the trial court
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abused its discretion in concluding that, with an appropriate limiting instruction,
the risk of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence
to rebut Rodriguez's claim that he touched K.S.'s breasts for a non-sexual
purpose.

See State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 328 P.3d 539 (Ct. App. 2014)

(although evidence of other bad acts "carried some risk that the jury would use it
for an improper purpose," trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that, with a limiting instruction, risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially
outweigh probative value of evidence for permissible purpose).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdicts finding Rodriguez guilty of four counts of sexual battery on
a minor child 16 or 17 years of age.
DATED this 5th day of December 2014.

ORI A. FLEMIN,
Deputy Attorne}-Oeneral
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of December 2014, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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